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Dumping and the Canadian Steel Industry
by John D. Allan*
I AM PLEASED TO have an opportunity to contribute to this conference
on a subject of continuing interest and concern-the dumping of steel into
Canada and the United States.
When we talk about dumping in the context of international steel trade,
we should recognize that article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade states that "[t]he contracting parties recognize that dumping . . . is to

be condemned if it causes or threatens material injury to an established industry or materially retards establishment of a domestic industry"' in the territory of a contracting party.
It is important, therefore, that we recognize we are talking about injurious dumping. Without this essential element of dumping no action can be
taken; indeed, in the minds of some, dumped imports which do not injure
are beneficial in that they confer a welfare benefit on consumers. It is also
important to recognize that the concept that injury must be observed is central to the application of other protective measures, such as action against
subsidized imports or temporary relief from low cost imports.
With the increasing involvement of governments in trade, the question of
subsidization has become increasingly important; indeed, it is receiving particular attention in the current GATT multilateral trade negotiations.
Similarly, the evolution of many lesser developed countries toward industrial
states capable of producing and exporting a variety of products, including
steel, at low cost has been going on for some time. Actions taken by the
Canadian and other governments with regard to low cost textile goods are indicative of emerging problems in this area. Thus, while significant factors influencing international steel trade continue to emerge, dumping remains a
major perennial problem in the world steel industry due to demand-supply
conditions and the cost structure of steel producers. Construction and capital
goods, both primary markets for steel, are characterized by market cyclicality
which is reflected in the demand for steel. When the business cycles of the
major industrialized countries become synchronized, as occurred in the first
half of this decade, then global steel supply can change from a condition of
general shortage to one of massive oversupply in a relatively brief period of
time.
High fixed costs, particularly for debt-financed, large scale steel plants,
make it vital to maintain capacity-utilization rates. In times of lagging
* President, The Steel Company of Canada, Ltd., Toronto. This paper was delivered at

the Canada-United States Law Institutes Conference on Steel Dumping into Canada and the
United States, held September 29 & 50, 1978, at the University of Western Ontario, London.
I The GATT Antidumping Code was adopted following the Kennedy Round of trade
negotiations. The Code's formal title is Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, found in Basic Instruments 15th Supp. (Geneva,
1967).
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domestic demand, sales into offshore markets may be welcomed at any price
that will contribute to overhead. This situation is compounded when, in
many countries due to legislation or contractual agreement, it is not possible
to reduce the work force in line with reduced output, and labor then becomes
an added element of fixed cost. The net result of market cyclicality and high
fixed costs is large fluctuation in the international transaction prices of steel
products as well as the adoption of predatory trading practices by exporters
in steel surplus nations.
At this point, it might be helpful to pause and summarize a few of the
main characteristics of the Canadian steel industry:
(1)

Excluding foundries, there are currently fifteen steel producers,
employing directly about 50,000 people and having a combined
production capacity of up to nineteen million raw steel tons.
(2) In 1977, national steel output equalled 14.9 million raw steel
tons, placing Canada eleventh among steel producing countries
in the world. (See Appendix I for a list of the world's top
twelve steel producing countries.)
(3) Five integrated producers (Stelco, Dofasco, Algoma, Sidbec
and Sysco) represent roughly eighty-seven percent of total
capacity, the balance being made up by smaller, non-integrated
producers. (Appendix II indicates the location of steel plants
throughout Canada.)
(4) The bulk of steelmaking capacity-better than eighty-five percent
is privately owned, with government involvement limited to three
active producers, namely Sysco in Nova Scotia, Sidbec in
Quebec, and Ipsco in Saskatchewan.
(5) Due to its geographic extent and to the relative absence of nontariff barriers, the Canadian steel market is vulnerable to
imports, particularly in its Western and Eastern regions. Steel
imports as a percentage of apparent consumption have averaged
14.5% in the 1970's compared with nearly sixteen percent in
the 1960's. Over the past five years, an average forty percent of
steel imports have been sourced from the United States, with
twenty-five percent each from the EEC and Japan. (See Appendix III.)
(6) Normally, Canada runs a small negative steel trade balance, but
last year, aided by a depreciated dollar, exports exceeded
imports by 522,000 tons, or 4.5% of total shipments. A
net surplus export position should be, recorded again this
year.
(7) Of equal importance, however, is that Canada has a large negative balance in indirect trade of finished steel in the form of
manufactured goods. In 1977, there was an $11.1 billion trade
deficit in finished goods, the bulk of which is represented by
steel intensive machinery and equipment.
I would like to now refer to Canadian antidumping legislation and procedures thereunder and indicate how this process has been applied in the case
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of steel products. The pertinent legislation is the Antidumping Act of 19682
and Regulations thereunder, s which came into force on January 1, 1969,
replacing the antidumping legislation contained in section 6 of the Customs
Tariff. 4 The Act was drafted to reflect the basic concepts and principles of
the GATT Antidumping Code.
Under the Antidumping Act, goods are deemed to have been dumped if
the "normal value" of the goods exceeds the export price of the goods, with
the margin of dumping being the amount by which the normal value exceeds
the export price. 5 Antidumping duties equal to the margin of dumping may
be levied when it can be established that dumping "has caused, is causing or
is likely to cause material injury to the production in Canada of like goods, or
has materially retarded or is materially retarding the establishment of the
6
production in Canada of like goods."
One of the chief problems with the antidumping procedural system has
been the time and expense involved, although administrative changes have
recently been made to expedite the process. Briefly, the procedure is as
follows. After initial enquiries, usually undertaken as a result of complaints
by a Canadian producer, the Deputy Minister of National Revenue, Customs
and Excise, issues a formal notice of investigation if in his opinion there is
evidence of both dumping and injury. 7 The question of dumping is investigated by the Antidumping Directorate of the Department of National
Revenue, and if a preliminary determination of dumping is reached, provisional duties are imposed and the case is referred to the independent Antidumping Tribunal for public hearings on the question of injury.9 The
Tribunal is required to make its finding within ninety days, 10 and in the
event that material injury is found to have been caused, the Deputy Minister
must make a final determination of dumping and the margin of dumping."'
There is a right of appeal to the Tariff Board within sixty days from the date
of the decision. 2 In the past, this whole process has taken from one to two
years, an undue period of time when international trading conditions change
so rapidly. An action concerning the dumping of stainless flat rolled steel and
alloy tool steel bars,' 3 initiated in 1972, illustrates how the outcome can be
2 Antidumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.A-15, as amended by R.S.C. 1970 (2d Supp.) c.1 &
c.10, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.43 & c.63.
3 Antidumping Regulations, SOR/69-18,
as amended by SOR/69-123, SOR/71-126,
SOR/72-191, SOR/72-369, SOR/72-370, SOR/74-581.
4 Customs Tariff, R.S.C. 1970, c.C-41, § 6.
5 Antidumping Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.A-15, § 8, as amended by R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.) c.1
& c.10, S.C. 1970-71-72, c.43 & c.63.
' Id. § 3.

Id. § 13(1).
SId. § 15(1)(a).

7

Id. § 16(1).
'

Id. § 16(3).

IId. § 17(1).
12Id. § 19(1).
13 Stainless flat rolled steels originating in or exported from Sweden and alloy tool steel
bars, not including high speed, AISI P-20 mould steel and die blocks, originating in or exported
from Sweden and Austria (ADT-5-73), September 18, 1973.
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affected by a lengthy process. In this instance, a notice of investigation was
issued in April 1972, but it was not until June 1973, fourteen months later,
that a preliminary determination of dumping was made and the case referred
to the Antidumping Tribunal. By this time steel markets had strengthened
significantly, and in an environment of maximum production utilisation the
Tribunal found no material injury and terminated the proceedings. This outcome was cause for concern since it suggested that the industry was
vulnerable to sporadic periods of dumping with no effective recourse to
discourage this practice in the future.
Until recently, few antidumping cases concerning steel products were prosecuted under the Antidumping Act. The effectiveness of the legislation was
felt to be limited by the complexity of the information required to be filed
by the complainant, by the difficulty of providing evidence of dumping and
of material injury, and by the time, expense and uncertainty involved in the
process. However, several recent cases have been handled with relative
dispatch, thereby restoring a measure of faith on the part of domestic steel
producers in the antidumping process. Low priced imports of steel flowing into Canada in 1976 caused complaints to be registered by the industry concerning possible dumping of three categories of steel product; carbon steel bar
size angles, 1 4 stainless plate and sheet,15 and wide flange beams.16 In each
case a notice of investigation was issued in March 1977, and a preliminary
determination of dumping was made within six to seven months. Thus,
within a comparatively short period of time provisional duties were imposed,
providing the relief sought by Canadian producers of these product lines and
also serving notice to others that effective dumping action would be taken.
Subsequently, hearings by the Antidumping Tribunal resulted in findings of
material injury, a final determination of dumping was made and antidumping duties were established.
A potentially dangerous precedent was established when, in response to
complaints registered by the government of the province of British Columbia
and several steel fabricators, the federal cabinet announced in February 1978,
the remission of dumping duties collected on wide flange beams imported into
Canada since September 1977, and the undertaking to continue the remission
through June of 1978. It was the industry's opinion that this action was totally
unjustified and served to undermine the protection provided by antidumping legislation. To the degree that it encouraged even larger volumes of
dumped imports to beat the expiry date of the remission order, it added to
the intensity and duration of the material injury to Canadian steel producers.
Fortunately, the implications of this action were recognized by the govern14Hot rolled carbon steel bar size angles, having each leg less than 3 inches in length,
originating in or exported from Japan (ADT-13-77), December 30, 1977.
15 Stainless steel plate originating in the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and the
Republic of South Africa and stainless steel sheets, not including cold rolled sheet in grades AISI
409, AISI 410S and AISI 434, originating in the Federal Republic of Germany and Japan
(ADT-14-77), January 13, 1978.
16 Wide flange steel shapes, etc., originating in the United Kingdom, France, Japan, the
Republic of South Africa, Belgium and Luxembourg (ADT-12-77), December 29, 1977.

1979]

STEEL DUMPING CONFERENCE

ment and the remission order was allowed to expire on schedule, and
assurance was given that the temporary remission program would not be extended to other products.
Currently, special Canadian antidumping procedures have been established for steel products as a result of extraordinary measures recently taken by
the United States Government and the European Commission to assist in
eliminating injurious steel imports and restoring order to their domestic inrdustries. In the United States, the Treasury Department has instituted the
highly controversial reference or trigger price mechanism. In essence, trigger
prices are designed to assist in the elimination of unfair competition from imports by accelerating antidumping action. Steel imported at prices below the
published "trigger price" may be subject tq accelerated or "fast track" antidumping investigation unless the importer can show within thirty days' time
that there is no justification for such action.
Trigger prices were brought into force in the United States on February
21, 1978, and to date the Canadian steel industry has experienced no undue
difficulty in complying with the regulations. From our viewpoint, the trigger
price mechanism is a good start in establishing speedy antidumping action in
the United States. There is still a great deal of debate on the methodology of
establishing the trigger price level, but in the final analysis, a system whereby
antidumping cases are processed within a short time frame is essential and
much more equitable than import quotas which penalize current and future
fair competition.
In similar fashion, the European Commission, by implementing the
Davignon Plan, has acted to restore price stability in European steel markets
by setting price minimums for domestic producers and, effective January 1,
1978, announcing a basic price system for imports. Under this system, steel
imported at less than the basic price is subject to automatic antidumping investigation and the immediate imposition of provisional antidumping duties.
The basic price system is intended to be a temporary measure until voluntary
restraint agreements have been completed with the major steel exporters to
the European Community.
In light of the measures taken by the United States and the European
Community, there was considerable concern within the Canadian steel industry and the Canadian government that steel diverted from European and
United States markets might flood into Canada, causing a drastic disruption
of markets. Recognizing that normal antidumping procedures would be inadequate in such circumstances, the Minister of National Revenue announced
early in 1978 the formation, within the Antidumping Directorate, of a special
Steel Task Force. The Task Force is to monitor imports of steel into Canada
and, where it is deemed to be warranted, initiate and conduct accelerated
antidumping investigations which are to result in determinations respecting
the application of provisional duties within a three month time period.
Needless to say, the industry is encouraged that the government has seen fit
to take measures to ensure that Canada does not become the repository of
surplus international steel looking for a viable market.
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Many developing countries (South Korea, Brazil, Mexico, Iran, etc.) have
announced ambitious steel expansion projects as an integral part of their national industrialization plans. Much of this capacity may be justified on the
basis of import displacement; however, to the degree that excess steel capacity
is installed to serve export markets, the potential for damaging trade practices in periods of weak steel demand is increased. At this time, I think it is
fair to say that Canadian steel producers are generally satisfied that existing
antidumping legislation can provide adequate protection, provided the provisions are vigorously enforced. Procedures have been streamlined and it is
hoped that the time deadlines will not be relaxed as international steel
markets recover.
In my opinion, effective antidumping action should be preferred to other
approaches, such as quotas, because only one determination arises, namely
the imposition or non-imposition of dumping duties. It is, therefore, free
from political and other encumbrances, such as the requirement that a contracting party to GATT taking escape clause action under article XIX, offer
compensation to the affected trading parties. However, the fact that a
number of recent private and governmental studies concerning the dumping
of steel in the United States market reached contradictory conclusions is indicative of the complexity of the issue. Since much of the problem is caused
by conflicting cost and price data, there would seem to be reason to support
the proposal being advanced through the OECD that there be established a
permanent committee to compile accurate data on national steel industries
and to monitor world supply and demand conditions in steel markets. Such a
body could improve the stability of international steel markets by establishing
common policies to encourage fair trade, by providing a forum for consultation and settlement of disputes, and by encouraging the emphasis on
domestic markets in justifying investment in steel growth.
While the subject of this conference is dumping, it is, of course, only one
of a number of unfair trade practices prevalent in international markets. In
practice, for example, it makes little difference to the domestic producer
whether unreasonably low import prices are due to dumping or are due to
some form of subsidy granted to the exporter. In this regard, a matter of
potential concern to the Canadian steel industry is competition from government owned or controlled industries which now represent approximately
seventy-five percent of world steel production capacity. Government owned
firms tend to be shielded from the discipline of the marketplace and,
characteristically, are treated as instruments of national policy. Employment,
foreign exchange earnings, etc., will often take priority over profitability.
Government financial assistance or subsidization may take many forms such
as capital grants, guaranteed loans at preferential rates, exemption from taxation or direct underwriting of losses. Although a procedure is in place to
provide for countervailing duties on products directly or indirectly subsidized
for the export market, it has, as yet, not been applied to steel imports in
Canada. One outcome of the Tokyo Round of multilateral negotiations is expected to be the adoption of a code governing subsidies and countervailing
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duties, which could prove to be an international agreement equal in importance to the antidumping code adopted after the Kennedy Round of negotiation.
I now offer some observations as a practicing executive in the steel
business.
Dumping of steel always has its roots in excess capacity, be it related to
the siuation at an individual company or a number of companies within one
or more countries. Dumping of steel over an extended period or in large
magnitude over shorter periods does not contribute to the financial well-being
of any company involved in the practice, be it government owned or privately
owned. Selling below cost or even on a contribution basis cannot be justified
in the steel industry by any stretch of the imagination if the capital intensive
investments involved (including those related to environmental controls) are
to be justified on a sound economic basis. Thus, the corporate planners of
every steel company in the Western world are on the spot and must recognize
that markets cannot be bought and, more than ever, must be concerned with
the supply-demand equation as it relates to their domestic markets as well as
to international markets. Antidumping safeguards must continue to exist in
the United States and Canada because there will be steel companies, particularly those owned by governments in various countries, whose expansion
would envision participation in world steel markets well beyond their
domestic base, no matter what the cost. Current trade problems in steel,
however, will, we hope, minimize this type of approach.
The interesting question is whether or not corporate steel planners and
decision-makers will be able to get the supply-demand curve to the point
where it can be maintained within the limits that avoid large scale inflation
of steel prices through constant shortages on one hand, and large scale dumping through constant excess on the other. This is a tall order, particularly
when economic cycles are difficult to predict. If a steadi momentum in
economic growth, albeit slow, can be maintained in the Western world, then
I believe steel has a chance of getting back into balance by the mid-to-late
1980's. There are a few factors working in favour of this:
(1) Shutting down of obsolete plant is now much more acceptable.
Large scale, modern, integrated steel plants, particularly as in
Japan, have illustrated what the industry can do relative to
improved costs, environmental control and quality. These plants
are setting the technological base which will be required to
remain competitive.
(2) Financial requirements to construct new green-field, integrated,
world-competitive steel plants are of a very high magnitude
as compared to the past. This high capital cost, in addition to
inflation and recent poor earnings records of steel companies,
mitigates against rapid expansion of new capacity from a
financial point of view.
(3) Steel is volume-sensitive and the breakeven point is very high
relative to capacity. Many expansion plans are on the backburners awaiting greater utilization of present plant that would
bring about better financial return.
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(4) Market growth for the many various steel products is undergoing
readjustment and is becoming much more difficult to predict
with certainty; a problem which was not the case in the past.
Some International Iron and Steel Institute charts produced for the 1977 Annual Meeting illustrate my points graphically. (See Appendices IV-IX.)
In conclusion, the extent of dumping is a function of the supply-demand
curve of world steel. To prevent world steel trade problems and constant antidumping actions in the United States and Canada, the excess of supply must
be brought down to a more reasonable figure. Responsibility for achieving
this lies primarily with the planners and decision-makers in the steel industry,
who must relate to the new realities and eliminate any cavalier approach to
market availability. Expansion of steelmaking facilitates in any country must
be based on demand that can be achieved primarily from the domestic
market of that country and from any demand that can be achieved in international steel trade through fair and competitive practices. Disregard for such
principles is irresponsible activity in my opinion, and should call for some
penalty. That is why antidumping legislation and actions taken thereunder
are good backstops in maintaining the planning discipline that is vital if
reasonable orderliness is to be achieved in international steel trade, and if the
steel industry in the individual countries of the Western world is to remain
viable and efficient.

APPENDIX I
1977 RAW STEEL PRODUCTION
(million tons)
USSR
USA
Japan
West Germany
China
Italy
France
United Kingdom
Poland
Czechoslovakia
Canada
Romania

BY COUNTRY

161.7
124.7
112.9
43.0
25.8
25.7
24.4
22.6
19.7
16.6
14.9
12.6
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APPENDIX II
STEEL PLANT LOCATIONS
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APPENDIX III
CANADIAN STEEL

(thousand net tons)

YEAR

IMPORTS

1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977

971
910
836
670
625
719
1,137
1,736
1,221
1,165
1,094
1,600
1,076
1,574
1,761
1,861
2,739
1,340
1,136
1,207

IMPORTS AS 5
EXPORTS OF CONSUMPTIC
275
362
755
526
609
799
784
610
673
751
1,103
707
1,310
1,210
1,174
990
1,011
861
1,426
1,729

23.9%
18.2%

(a)

18.9%
14.1%
12.2%

(b)

12.3%
16.1%
21.1%
15.9%
16.1%
13.4%
18.2%
12.2%
16.4%
16.9%
15.8%
20.7%
12.3%
10.8%
11.1%

(a)

(b)
(a)- Stelco strike year
(b)
(a)

(b)

(a) Canadian supply shortage vs. domestic demand.
(b) Canadian supply in balance or in excess of domestic demand.

APPENDIX IV
WESTERN WORLD APPARENT STEEL CONSUMPTION

(year to year percentage change)
1973

1974

1975

1976

1977 (est.)

Western
World total

+14.2

-0.7

-16.0

+5.6

+3.8

+14.4

-4.0

-18.8

+6.9

+2.6

+12.4

+25.1

+1.0

+0.3

+9.8

of which:
Industrialized
countries,
Developing
countries
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APPENDIX V
INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES APPARENT STEEL CONSUMPTION

(year to year percentage change)

North America
Oceania
EEC
Europe
Japan
South Africa
Canada

1973

1974

+13.6
+27.8
+ 9.1
+ 9.4
+26.1
+14.1
+13.3

- 2.9
+14.7
- 4.5
+ 7.2
-12.2
+ 8.1
+11.5

1975
-23.4
-32.7
-18.0
-14.3
-14.0
+18.8
-17.0

1976
+10.8
+ 4.4
+13.4
+ 0.2
- 3.6
-23.3
- 3.6

1977 (est.)
+ 8.8
+ 5.8
- 3.2
+ 2.7
+ 0.6
-17.6
+ 2.5

APPENDIX VI
WESTERN WORLD APPARENT STEEL CONSUMPTION

(million metric tons)

USA
Japan
EEC
Other
Total

1977 (est.)
140
66
110
133

1978 (forecast)
145
68
114
144
471

% change
+3.6
+3.0
+3.6
+8.3
+4.9
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APPENDIX VII
ADDITIONAL STEEL CAPACITY
TOTAL CAPACITY ESTIMATES:
WESTERN WORLD

(million metric tons)

1975
4 years

+65

8 years

+75

1977

1985

annual growth rate
1.5%

[Vol. 2:39 .
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APPENDIX VIII
ADDITIONAL STEEL CAPACITY

(million metric tons)
Munich estimate (1974 to 1985)
Current estimate (1974 to 1985)

240
142 (-41%)

of which:
Already installed
(1974 to 1977) (4 years)
Projected
(1978 to 1985) (8 years)

64.5
77.5

APPENDIX IX
ADDITIONAL STEEL CAPACITY

PROJECTED ADDITIONS:

1978 TO 1985
(million metric tons)

WESTERN WORLD

EEC
Other Western Europe
North America
Latin America
Africa
Middle East
Far East
Oceania

9.1
4.9
9.1
17.4
1.6
6.7
26.9
1.8

Total

77.5

